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I. Introduction
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as
well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that
which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of
government, that alone is a just government, which impartially
secures to every man, whatever is his own.1

These words are no less true today than when James Madison
wrote them for the National Gazette in 1792, as concerns over
ownership and property occupy a central place in our
jurisprudence.2 Property rights are some of the most foundational
known to the law, both providing a major impetus to its historical
development and creating many of the most familiar interactions
that a citizen will have with the legal system.3 The protection of
property rights was an animating factor behind the creation of the
Bill of Rights, with the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution directly protecting the right to property.4 This
constitutional protection has given rise to innumerable legal
assertions of property rights by American citizens over the
centuries since its passage.
While the body of property rights involves nuanced common,
constitutional, and statutory legal interactions, many of the most
insightful jurists have highlighted the dispositive importance of
the right to exclude as a central factor behind the law’s approach
to property.5 The significance of the right to exclude takes on a
particular importance in matters of real property for both cultural
and historical reasons, and volumes of scholarship have been
1. James Madison, For the National Gazette, 27 March 1792, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-14-02-0238 (last
visited Feb. 1, 2019) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
2. See Paul Turner & Sam Kalen, Takings and Beyond: Implications for
Regulation, 19 ENERGY L.J. 25, 46 (1998) (discussing the importance of property
rights in the development of American federal constitutional jurisprudence).
3. See id. (describing the importance of property rights as a dominant
theme during the founding and throughout America’s federal constitutional
jurisprudence).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (containing the Takings Clause: “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”).
5. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L.
REV. 730, 731 (1998) (describing the central role that the right to exclude holds in
defining property).
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produced on issues pertaining to the importance of that right when
placed in conflict with harms almost entirely of a symbolic nature.6
A. Virginia and the Atlantic Coast Pipeline
Of all the modern legal battlegrounds between eminent
domain authority and real property rights, one of the most
noteworthy is occasioned by the development of utilities, most
significantly in the context of energy development.7 Publicized and
protracted battles between landowners and utility companies have
erupted across the nation, as pipeline and power line construction
continues to require the use of private land for public benefit.8 The
construction of new pipelines has pitted pro-development business
and political interests against anti-pipeline landowners and
environmentalists, creating a charged atmosphere in which
takings jurisprudence occupies a central role.9 As a logical result
of this context, statutory authority for private entities to perform
surveys—a limitation on the landowner’s right to exclude that is

6. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of
Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 995 (2004) (stating that recovery is possible under
the common law in cases of trespass to real property even without actual harm).
7. See generally Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Eminent Domain: Right to
Enter Land for Preliminary Survey or Examination, 29 A.L.R.3d 1104 (1970)
(outlining the arguments for and against the practice of delegating eminent
domain authority for surveying purposes).
8. See Keith Schneider, Nebraska Regulators Approve Keystone XL Pipeline
After Years of Controversy, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017, 12:15 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-nebraska-keystone-20171120-story.html
(describing the legal conflict surrounding construction of the Keystone XL
Pipeline) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); see also Blake Nicholson, Lawsuit Filed by Dakota Access Protesters to
Proceed,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov.
14,
2017),
https://www.apnews.
com/a0bf90f2e1854218832a39ab22ba50a9 (detailing a lawsuit filed by Dakota
Access Pipeline protesters in North Dakota alleging civil rights violations) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
9. See Michael Martz, Dominion to Withdraw Lawsuits Against
Landowners Over Pipeline Surveys—and Start Over, DAILY PROGRESS (Apr. 7,
2015), http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/local/dominion-to-withdraw-lawsuitsagainst-landowners-over-pipeline-surveys-and/article_02d78830-dd81-11e49fd4-833eaaf2afc1.html (reporting on Dominion Transmission Inc.’s legal battles
with landowners over construction of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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itself a harbinger of future takings—has become a flash point in
the larger eminent domain conflict.10
This conflict has taken on a particular recent importance in
Virginia, where construction of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline has
engendered significant legal pushback by landowners.11 The
Atlantic Coast Pipeline (ACP) is a proposed 600-mile natural gas
transmission pipeline to be built in the states of West Virginia,
Virginia, and North Carolina.12 The pipeline is to be built and
operated by Atlantic, a company created by utility corporations
Dominion Energy, Duke Energy, Piedmont Natural Gas, and
Southern Company Gas.13 The controversial pipeline was approved
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in October of 2017,
and preliminary tree-felling work commenced January 2018.14
The project continued to face stiff opposition in its first year,
with the most serious challenges stemming from an ongoing series
of legal actions.15 In December 2018, the Fourth Circuit Court of
10. See id. (detailing the resistance of property owners to legal surveys
conducted by natural gas companies).
11. See id. (referencing multiple lawsuits filed by both landowners and the
Atlantic Coast Pipeline consortium).
12. Atlantic
Coast
Pipeline,
DOMINION
ENERGY,
https://www.dominionenergy.com/about-us/natural-gas-projects/atlantic-coastpipeline (last visited Feb. 1, 2019) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
13. See id. (describing the origins of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline).
14. See Emily Brown, Nelson Residents React to Federal Approval of Atlantic
Coast
Pipeline,
NEWS
&
ADVANCE
(Oct
14,
2017),
http://www.newsadvance.com/news/local/nelson-residents-react-to-federalapproval-ofatlantic-coast-pipeline/article_a56dd0ef-14c6-5389-b5d6-138a06
00566f.html (“[T]he three members of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing
ACP to construct and operate the $5 billion, 600-mile project . . . .”) (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Lowell
Rose, Dominion Energy Introduces Interactive Map for Atlantic Coast Pipeline,
NBC (Feb. 16, 2018, 5:08 PM), http://www.nbc29.com/story/37526947/dominionenergy-introduces-interactive-map-for-atlantic-coast-pipeline (referencing an
interactive map illustrating the construction and timeline of the Atlantic Coast
Pipeline) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
15. See Gregory Schneider, As Court Challenges Pile Up, Gas Pipeline Falls
Behind, WASH. POST (Dec. 31. 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
virginia-politics/as-court-challenges-pile-up-gas-pipeline-falls-behind/2018/12/29/8
637dbd2-0549-11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.
2008d55d32d3 (“Protesters banging drums may get more attention, but what has
really damaged the controversial Atlantic Coast Pipeline in 2018 has been quiet
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Appeals vacated U.S. Forest permits that allowed the pipeline to
cross protected lands and stayed the granting of new permits
related to endangered species until ongoing environmental
litigation has been resolved.16 Attempts by the ACP to narrow the
scope of the stay have proved unsuccessful.17 In the same month,
Nelson County denied floodplain crossing requests, which has
forced the Pipeline to bring suit requesting federal preemption.18
As of January 2019, construction has stalled on the ACP, and the
project faces an uncertain future in the courts.19
Proponents of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline claim that its
construction will create jobs in the communities that it passes
through, while also generating revenue for the three states in the
form of additional taxes, and aiding consumers through projected
energy savings.20 The ACP website additionally claims to have
action taking place in courtrooms.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
16. See id. (“The judges were particularly harsh, finding that Forest Service
staffers had raised serious questions about the permits but then made a sharp,
unexplained turnaround and approved them. The court called the decision
‘mysterious.’”); see also Carl Surran, Atlantic Coast Pipeline Halted Again by U.S.
Circuit
Court,
SEEKING
ALPHA
(Dec.
7,
2018,
7:10
PM),
https://seekingalpha.com/news/3415460-atlantic-coast-pipeline-halted-u-scircuit-court (“The Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has stayed new permits
related to vulnerable species for the 600-mile, 1.5B cf/day Atlantic Coast Pipeline
project.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
17. See Carl Surran, Atlantic Coast Pipeline Bid to Ease Stay Rejected by
Appeals
Court,
SEEKING
ALPHA
(Jan.
14,
2019
10:27
AM),
https://seekingalpha.com/news/3422749-atlantic-coast-pipeline-bid-ease-stayrejected-appeals-court (“The Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said Friday it
will not ease its stay on a permit for the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, increasing
prospects for a delay . . . .”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
18. See Emily Brown, Atlantic Coast Pipeline Sues Nelson County over
Zoning
Decision,
NEWS
&
ADVANCE
(Dec.
17,
2018),
https://www.newsadvance.com/news/local/atlantic-coast-pipeline-sues-nelsoncounty-over-zoning-decision/article_47164c00-6573-5f1c-9c86fa41462048d7.html (“The lawsuit . . . is seeking a judgment stating the Natural
Gas Act ‘preempts’ the requirements of Nelson’s floodplain ordinance, which
would include ‘obtaining any zoning permits for any of the floodplain crossings.’”)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
19. See Surran, supra note 17 (stating that the Fourth Circuit’s stay could
cause a significant delay in the construction of the pipeline).
20. See
About
ACP,
ATLANTIC
COAST
PIPELINE,
https://atlanticcoastpipeline.com/about/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2019)
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made extensive revisions to the planned route in order to
accommodate the concerns of environmentalists and landowners.21
The opposition to the ACP is mostly composed of these residential
landowners and environmentalists in areas surrounding the
projected path.22 Environmental opposition groups like the
Southern Environmental Law Center view the ACP as destructive
and unnecessary, and they argue that the disruption that
construction would cause is unwarranted.23 Landowners have
challenged the use of eminent domain powers in the initial stages
of the ACP’s construction as well, most significantly in the form of
survey delegation powers.24 They argue that eminent domain
powers are being misused by the ACP’s surveys, and some have
stated their intent to withhold their permission for surveys of their
land until compelled by the courts.25
The construction of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline is but one
example of the expansion of pipeline construction facing states like
(“[T]he pipeline will help the region lower emissions, improve air quality, grow
local economies and create thousands of new jobs in manufacturing and other
industries.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
21. See id. (“[M]ore than 300 additional route adjustments were made to
avoid environmentally sensitive areas and address individual landowner
concerns . . . .”).
22. See Martz, supra note 9 (providing examples of environmentalists and
landowners opposed to the construction of the pipeline).
23. See Risky and Unnecessary Natural Gas Pipelines Threaten Our Region,
SOUTHERN ENVTL. L. CTR, https://www.southernenvironment.org/cases-andprojects/proposed-natural-gas-pipeline-threatens-scenic-western-virginia
(last
visited Feb. 3, 2019) (“This unnecessary pipeline will not only harm the
mountains, forests and waterways in it’s [sic] path—it will also disrupt the lives
of the people living and working along its 600 mile long route and lock a new
generation into decades more of fossil fuel consumption.”) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
24. See Michael Martz, Va. Supreme Court Upholds Gas Survey Law on
Entering Private Property, but Requires Specific Notice to Landowners, DAILY
PROGRESS (Jul. 13, 2017), http://www.dailyprogress.com/realestate/articles/vasupreme-court-upholds-gas-survey-law-on-entering-private/article_5ed0023867f5-11e7-8f71-d77187416f70.html (describing the results of a recent Virginia
Supreme Court case upholding surveying laws) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
25. See id. (“‘Eminent domain is supposed to be reserved for those cases in
which the public good outweighs the public harm,’ said [the] president of Friends
of Nelson, one of six groups that presented the governor's office . . . with petitions
with more than 5,000 signatures of people opposed to the pipeline.”).
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Virginia. A second construction project is underway in Virginia, as
the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) will wind through the state
as well.26 This project has engendered a particularly passionate
opposition from local landowners, as a federal judge has had to
order an eminent domain seizure of private land over the
objections of almost 300 property owners.27 In a scene illustrative
of the human impact of eminent domain seizures, a landowner was
described as having stood “as close as she could to the pipeline’s
right of way, marked by blue-and-white flagged stakes, and dared
the men with chainsaws to keep coming.”28 This opposition has, as
in the case of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, succeeded in delaying
and potentially even ending construction through the use of
environmental challenges and vocal activism.29
26. See
Overview,
MOUNTAIN
VALLEY
PIPELINE,
https://www.mountainvalleypipeline.info/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2018) (listing the
Virginian counties along the proposed MVP route) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
27. See Laurence Hammack, Judge Allows Mountain Valley Pipeline Work
To Proceed on Private Property, ROANOKE TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018),
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/judge-allows-mountain-valley-pipelinework-to-proceed-on-private/article_c352fd47-2e15-59c9-9459-ebee94260015.html
(“A federal judge on Friday granted Mountain Valley Pipeline immediate
possession of the parcels, which it gained through the laws of eminent domain
after nearly 300 landowners refused the company’s offers to purchase easements
through which the pipeline will pass.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
28. Heather Rousseau, As Tree-Cutting Continues for the Mountain Valley
Pipeline, So Do the Protests, ROANOKE TIMES (Apr. 15, 2018),
http://www.roanoke.com/news/local/giles_county/as-tree-cutting-continues-forthe-mountain-valley-pipeline-so/article_8b07005a-3ff3-11e8-a908a3db8fb38cec.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
29. See Tommy Lopez, Mountain Valley Pipeline Says Projects May Never Be
Finished,
WSLS
10
(Dec.
18,
2018),
https://www.wsls.com/news/virginia/mountain-valley-pipeline-says-projectsmay-never-be-finished (‘‘Recent decisions by regulatory and judicial authorities
in pending proceedings could impact our or the MVP Joint Venture’s ability to
obtain all approvals and authorizations necessary to complete certain projects on
the projected time frame or at all or our ability to achieve the expected investment
return . . . .”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); see also Laurence Hammack, Mountain Valley Pipeline Files Response
To
State's
Lawsuit,
ROANOKE TIMES
(Jan.
11,
2019),
https://
www.roanoke.com/business/news/mountain-valley-pipeline-files-response-tostate-s-lawsuit/article_96db0fec-5350-5822-b027-83b535423217.html (“The legal
action is based on dozens of inspections conducted by DEQ officials and employees
of MBP, a private company hired by the state to assist in monitoring construction
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While every state in the Union has a statute delegating in
some form surveying authority to private entities, the practice has
been especially visible and controversial due to pipeline
construction in the Commonwealth of Virginia.30 A major point of
contention in pipeline development has centered upon the ability
of private companies to use delegated eminent domain powers to
survey land for possible future development.31 While recent
decisions by both a federal Virginia District Court and the state’s
Supreme Court have upheld the state’s surveying delegation law
from landowner challenges, the issue is far from resolved.32
Virginia therefore provides an ideal base for an examination of
survey delegation laws in the modern context of utilities
development.
B. Questions Presented
Delegation of eminent domain authority to private entities in
the context of surveying for utilities development has become a
topic of controversy in an era of ever-increasing economic
development;33 and as such, a detailed look at the practice’s origins
of the largest natural gas pipeline ever proposed for Southwest Virginia.”) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
30. See Duncan Adams, Virginia Supreme Court Ruling Upholds Surveying
Law; Challenges Still Possible, ROANOKE TIMES (July 13, 2017),
https://www.roanoke.com/townnews/law/virginia-supreme-court-ruling-upholdspipeline-surveying-law-challenges-still/article_305a7461-38aa-5234-b168c240232b774d.html (“The Virginia Supreme Court issued a unanimous ruling
Thursday that upheld a controversial state law allowing gas companies to survey
private property for a possible pipeline route without an owner’s consent.”) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
31. See Martz, supra note 24 (“The two decisions, both written by Justice
William C. Mims, represents the high court’s first judgments on a 2004 law that
has become a flash point in the bitter battles between property owners and the
developers of two natural gas pipelines proposed across hundreds of miles of
Virginia.”).
32. See John Murawski, Atlantic Coast Pipeline to Take Landowners to Court
to Clear Way for 600-Mile Project, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Nov. 16, 2017, 3:45 PM),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business/article185036078.html
(reporting on the legal conflicts surrounding the Atlantic Coast Pipeline’s
expansion into North Carolina) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
33. See Martz, supra note 24 (describing the outcomes of two cases before the
Supreme Court of Virginia involving “bitter battles between property owners and
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and its current situation in the United States is warranted in order
to formulate potential solutions. It is an issue that involves
significant questions that define what amounts to a government
taking and explores the extent to which a landowner has authority
over his or her property. As a result, the issue potentially affects a
massive portion of our society.34 In examining the practice of
survey delegation, this note will attempt to answer four related
questions: Do modern survey delegation laws find support in
historical uses of eminent domain?35 Does surveying amount to a
taking, especially in the wake of post-Kelo36 legal developments?37
If it does amount to a taking, should compensation be made?38
What method of compensation is to be used?39 Through analyses of
these questions this note will argue that the current surveying
delegation laws should be viewed as giving rise to a taking, and
they should be compensable by either a nominal sum or one
reached as part of a wider takings calculus.40
II. Survey Delegation and Virginia
A. § 56-49.0141
The planning of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline has engendered a
particularly noteworthy legal response in Virginia, as the recent
decisions of the federal District Court in Klemic42 and the Supreme
[natural gas pipeline] developers”).
34. See Murawski, supra note 32 (explaining that the Atlantic Coast
Pipeline from West Virginia to North Carolina will cross through the property of
approximately 2,900 landowners’, twenty percent of whom have not signed
voluntary agreements to allow for the use of their land).
35. See infra discussion Part III.
36. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005) (ruling that the
city’s proposed condemnations of private properties served a public purpose and
satisfied the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment).
37. See infra discussion Part IV.
38. See infra discussion Part V.
39. See infra discussion Part VI.
40. See infra discussion Part VII.
41. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-49.01 (2018) (granting natural gas companies the
right to inspect and enter any property without permission of the owner in certain
circumstances).
42. See Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 673, 690
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Court of Virginia in Palmer43 illustrated the modern controversy
over survey delegation laws. While surveys may at first appear to
be a relatively minor facet of wider eminent domain issues, these
cases reveal the foundational rights at issue in landowner
challenges at both levels of the American legal system.44
At the heart of both cases is a challenge to Virginia’s survey
delegation statute, § 56-49.01 (Natural gas companies; right of
entry upon property).45 The first element of the statute is directly
relevant to the analysis of this note, as it grants private entities
surveying powers.46 The language of this element warrants
inclusion in its entirety:
Any firm, corporation, company, or partnership, organized for
the bona fide purpose of operating as a natural gas company as
defined in 15 U.S.C. § 717a, as amended, may make such
examinations, tests, hand auger borings, appraisals, and
surveys for its proposed line or location of its works as are
necessary (i) to satisfy any regulatory requirements and (ii) for
the selection of the most advantageous location or route, the
improvement or straightening of its line or works, changes of
location or construction, or providing additional facilities, and
for such purposes, by its duly authorized officers, agents, or
employees, may enter upon any property without the written
permission of its owner if (a) the natural gas company has
requested the owner's permission to inspect the property as
provided in subsection B, (b) the owner's written permission is
(W.D. Va. 2015) (“[I]t is clear that the common law recognizes, and state and
federal courts have consistently upheld, the privilege to enter private property for
survey purposes before exercising eminent domain authority and that Virginia
law is fully in accord with the common law.”).
43. See Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414, 419 (Va. 2017)
(“In sum, Palmer’s right to exclude others is not absolute. The common law has
long recognized the privilege of an entity exercising eminent domain power to
enter private property to conduct surveys.”).
44. See infra Part II.B–C.
45. See Klemic, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 679 (“In an attempt to stop ACP or any
other company from entering their properties for this purpose, plaintiffs filed this
action, alleging that the statute, on its face and as applied, violates the United
States and Virginia Constitutions, and is thus void and unenforceable.”); see also
Palmer, 801 S.E.2d at 416 (describing appellant’s arguments that the statute
authorizing entry-for-survey powers only applies to domestic public service
companies, and more pertinently, that the statute is unconstitutional “because it
impermissibly burdens a fundamental right”).
46. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-49.01(A) (noting the requirements for proper
entry by a natural gas company to survey2018).
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not received prior to the date entry is proposed, and (c) the
natural gas company has given the owner notice of intent to
enter as provided in subsection C. A natural gas company may
use motor vehicles, self-propelled machinery, and power
equipment on property only after receiving the permission of
the landowner or his agent.47

This statute has been utilized in the initial planning and
surveying stages of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, and as a result, the
normally unremarkable Virginian law has taken center stage in a
heated legal conflict.48
B. Palmer
In Palmer, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered a
declaratory judgement requested by the Atlantic Coast Pipeline.49
Atlantic, an out-of-state utilities corporation, sought to enter the
appellant’s property for surveying purposes under Virginia’s
survey delegation statute, and was denied entry.50 The appellee
then filed for a declaratory judgement requesting a declaration of
its surveying rights.51 The circuit court found for the Pipeline, and
the property owner appealed.52 The Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether an out-of-state corporation could make use of
Virginia’s survey delegation law, and whether the law itself
infringed on post-Kelo provisions of the Constitution of Virginia.53
The Court found that the Pipeline could make use of the statute.54

47. Id. § 56-49.01(A).
48. See Martz, supra note 24 (articulating the use of the statute regarding
the preparations for the pipeline and the different responses to the Virginia
Supreme Court’s holding) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice); see also id. (“The Virginia Supreme Court has upheld,
for the third time, a hotly debated state law allowing natural gas companies to
enter private property without landowner permission to survey possible routes
for new pipelines.”).
49. See Palmer, 801 S.E.2d at 416 (detailing the procedural posture of the
case).
50. Id. at 415–16.
51. Id. at 416.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 415.
54. Id. at 417.
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The Court, however, found that it was limited to only addressing
one prong of the Appellant’s demurrer:
Palmer's demurrer argued that Code § 56–49.01 violated Article
I, § 11 by (1) authorizing “a taking or damaging of private
property for private use,” (2) authorizing ‘a taking or damaging
of private property without just compensation,” and
(3) “impermissibly burden[ing] a fundamental right.” However,
her second assignment of error is restricted to the third claim of
her demurrer. In fact, she expressly stated in her reply brief
that she is not making a “takings” argument on appeal.55

The exclusion of the first and second arguments of Palmer on
appeal have left open the possibility that Virginia’s survey
delegation statute may be analyzed as a taking by the state’s
highest court in the future.56 The Supreme Court of Virginia went
on to find that the survey law did not impermissibly burden a
fundamental right under the Virginia Constitution.57 While the
Palmer Court found for the defendant utilities company, it did so
without involving a takings-based paradigm.
C. Klemic
In Klemic, a United States District Court in Virginia
considered an action brought by landowners in Virginia against
natural gas companies, arguing that Virginia’s survey delegation
law was unconstitutional.58 The plaintiffs principally argued that
the statute was facially unconstitutional because: (a) the statute
violated the Fifth Amendment; (b) the statute violated the Fourth
Amendment; (c) the statute violated the Virginia Constitution; and

55. Id. at 418.
56. See id. (waiving the “takings” arguments in Palmer due to pleading
issues).
57. See id. at 420 (“The unambiguous language of Code § 56-49.01
establishes the General Assembly's intent that the entry-for-survey privilege be
available to foreign natural gas companies that do business within the
Commonwealth . . . . Palmer's fundamental property rights do not include the
right to exclude ACP . . . . [W]e affirm the circuit court's judgment.”).
58. See Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 673, 678
(W.D. Va. 2015) (outlining Plaintiff’s position “alleging that the statute [Virginia
Code § 56-49.01], on its face and as applied, violates the United States and
Virginia Constitutions, and is thus void and unenforceable.”).
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(d) the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment.59 In a
memorandum opinion, the Court rejected each of these
arguments.60 Most importantly for the purpose of this note, the
Court specifically rejected an argument that the survey delegation
law at issue could give rise to a compensable taking, finding that:
In sum, the court concludes that a landowner does not have a
constitutionally protected property right to exclude an
authorized utility from entering his property for survey
purposes and that, even if he did, § 56–49.01, on its face, does
not effect a compensable taking of that right. The court thus
holds that plaintiffs fail to allege a facial challenge to the
statute under the Takings Clause.61

The Klemic decision additionally rejected the Plaintiff’s claims
that the Virginia delegation statute violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.62 An appeal of the decision followed.63
This case is illustrative of the principal arguments against
consideration of survey delegation as a compensable taking, and it
includes a wide-ranging consideration of the issue from its
historical basis to the present controversy.64
The Klemic decision highlighted the importance of a takings
paradigm when considering survey delegation statutes,65 while
Palmer left open the possibility of a future revaluation of Virginia’s
59. Id. at 687–97.
60. See id. at 678 (“[T]he court concludes that plaintiffs' facial challenges to
the statute fail because the statute does not deprive a landowner of a
constitutionally protected property right, and that plaintiffs’ as-applied
challenges fail because they are not ripe. The court will therefore grant
defendants' motion and dismiss plaintiffs' complaint.”).
61. Id. at 694.
62. See id. at 688, 698 (“For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that
plaintiffs' facial challenges to Virginia Code § 56–49.01 fail because the statute
does not deprive a landowner of a constitutionally protected property right . . . .”).
63. See James Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., JUSTIA,
https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/ca4/15-2338
(last
visited
February 8, 2019) (providing docket information about the appeal filed in the
Fourth Circuit on October 30, 2015) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
64. See id. (addressing how the First and Fourteenth Amendments relate to
Taking Clause claims).
65. See id. at 691 (“Even assuming the existence of a right to exclude here,
the court would still conclude that § 56–49.01 is facially constitutional under the
Takings Clause because it does not effect a compensable taking of that right.”).
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statute by its highest court.66 While Virginia has recently become
an epicenter for survey delegation-related litigation as a result of
ACP preparations, the questions examined in these cases are of
importance to all American jurisdictions. This is especially true in
light of the seminal Kelo v. New London decision by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and the developments in the field of
eminent domain that have followed it.
D. Kelo and Eminent Domain Reform
Although well-recognized and defined, property protections in
American jurisprudence are not absolute, and they often come into
conflict with the ability of the state to take property though the use
of eminent domain.67 The right to property is both protected and
controlled by the state, and governmental authority to impose on
property rights has been a key issue dating to the formation of our
nation.68 The state’s ability to impose upon the right to exclude
through eminent domain authority has given rise to protracted
legal debates, especially in the aftermath of the seminal Kelo v.
City of New London decision.69
In Kelo, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a
Connecticut city’s use of eminent domain power as not being for a
sufficiently public use.70 The case had been granted certiorari after

66. See Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414, 419 (Va. 2017)
(failing to rule on the Taking Clause issue at hand).
67. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (“As its text
makes plain, the Takings Clause ‘does not prohibit the taking of private property,
but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.’” (quoting First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 314 (1987))).
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process or law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
69. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (ruling that the
City of New London’s “proposed condemnations” were for “public use” within the
meaning of the Takings Clause).
70. See id. at 472 (“In assembling the land needed for this project, the city’s
development agent has purchased property from willing sellers and proposes to
use the power of eminent domain to acquire the remainder of the property from
unwilling owners in exchange for just compensation.”).
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the state supreme court had upheld the eminent domain use.71 The
stated reason for the taking was economic development, and the
property at issue was a home that had been in the family of one
appellant for her entire life.72 “The question presented is whether
the city’s proposed disposition of this property qualifies as a ‘public
use’ within the meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution.”73 The Court did not find the
taking to violate the Takings Clause and upheld the use of eminent
domain authority.74 In the majority opinion, however, Justice
Stevens did explicitly leave open the possibility of states passing
additional restrictions on their own eminent domain powers.75
The Kelo decision greatly strengthened the base of eminent
domain powers while also leaving ample room for states to pass
laws controlling their own takings powers.76 Many states have
taken Justice Stevens’ advice to pass additional restrictions on the
use of eminent domain authority, including the Commonwealth of
Virginia.77 The Kelo decision—and the reactions to it—have
returned taking issues to the forefront of modern public and legal
debates, ushering in a new era of taking jurisprudence in the midst
of the passage of numerous statutes and constitutional
amendments.

71. Id. at 476.
72. Id. at 474–75.
73. Id. at 472.
74. Id. at 490.
75. Id. at 489 (“[N]othing in our opinion precludes any State from placing
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States
already impose ‘public use’ requirements that are stricter than the federal
baseline . . . established as a matter of state constitutional law . . . [or] in state
eminent domain statutes . . . . ”).
76. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response
to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2171 (2009) (describing the legal and public
reactions to the Kelo decision and detailing the need for future research on the
various state reactions to the decision).
77. See Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414, 420 (Va. 2017)
(“The 2012 amendment to Article I, § 11 accepted this invitation to place further
restrictions on the takings power.”).
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III. Eminent Domain
A. History of Eminent Domain

For the purposes of this note, it will be useful to briefly outline
the development of eminent domain and takings jurisprudence.
Eminent domain authority originates in the basis of the sovereign
as possessing, at a fundamental level, real property within its
jurisdiction:
Simply stated, eminent domain is an exercise of the inherent
power of the sovereign. The power of eminent domain refers to
the right of the sovereign, or of those to whom the power has
been delegated, to condemn private property for public use, and
to appropriate the ownership and possession thereof for such
use upon paying the owner a due compensation.78

Eminent domain laws, although based on legislative powers under
English common law, are largely an American innovation:
To be sure, the English and American colonial practices are the
main ancestors of modern American eminent domain, but the
writings of several Continental civil law jurisprudential writers
also influenced the American law in its formative stage . . . . [i]n
American law the subject has been raised to jurisprudential and
theoretical levels that do not exist in English law.79

The first eminent domain laws passed in the future United
States were the “mill acts” of the Thirteen Colonies, allowing for
the flooding of private land in order to construct mills.80 The
colonial Massachusetts legislature enacted the first mill law in
1713, and from that origin, state takings powers progressed to
encompass successively “railroads (mid-to-late 19th century),
mining in the Rocky Mountain West (late 19th century), urban
renewal (mid-20th century), [to] Kelo-style economic development

78. Rhode Island Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., L.P., 892 A.2d 87, 96 (R.I.
2006).
79. William B. Stoebuck & John W. Weaver, Eminent Domain: Overview, 17
WASH. PRAC., REAL EST. § 9.1 (2d ed.) (2018).
80. See Robert K. Fleck & F. Andrew Hanssen, Repeated Adjustment of
Delegated Powers and the History of Eminent Domain, 30 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
99, 104 (2010) (detailing the first iterations of colonial eminent domain takings in
mill acts involving the flooding of land).
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(late 20th century to present).”81 This evolution in takings
jurisprudence gradually moved away from origins based in
necessary community benefit to use for economic purposes, a shift
that is nowhere better illustrated than in the modern context of
natural gas pipeline development.
The original ownership of the sovereign in real property allows
the state to override the property rights that a landowner has in
his or her ownership, but from the earliest days of American legal
development limitations have been imposed on the scope of
eminent domain powers at all levels of government.82 The text of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires
that “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”83 The nebulous nature of
this early constitutional prohibition on the uncompensated taking
of private property has subsequently given rise to a massive body
of takings law.84 Private land has often been taken through
eminent domain powers for the purpose of developing resources
beneficial to the public, such as in the case of a road or power line.85
American takings law has gradually evolved to include private
companies engaged in public infrastructure development as
“public carriers,” allowing for the inherently public eminent
domain powers to be exercised by private entities.86 As a part of
the development of infrastructure through eminent domain
surveys frequently must be commissioned, in order to plan the
route of the road or utility. As the entities involved in utilities
development tend to be private in the context of pipeline
constructions, the surveys are generally taken by the same private
81. Id. at 103–104.
82. See id. at 103–06 (detailing the ways in which eminent domain power
was restricted).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
84. See Fleck & Hanssen, supra note 80 (arguing that takings of almost any
kind are permissible if a broad definition of constitutional limitations on eminent
domain is taken).
85. See id. at 100 n.5 (providing examples of the “myriad” ways eminent
domain powers have been applied).
86. See VA. CONST. ART. I, § 11 (“A public service company, public service
corporation, or railroad exercises the power of eminent domain for public use
when such exercise is for the authorized provision of utility, common carrier, or
railroad services.”).
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companies that will be developing the land.87 This intersection
between the temporary nature of surveying and the nuances of
takings jurisprudence has given rise to a body of law surrounding
the delegation of eminent domain authority to private surveying
groups.
B. Common Law and Statutory Basis of Survey Delegation
Private delegation of surveying authority is both historically
well-grounded and currently widespread. The practice has grown
from origins in the earliest American laws to the present, where
all fifty states possess a version of a survey delegation statute.88
Jurists have explored early versions of delegation statutes from the
earliest days of American jurisprudence, with one early Virginian
law allowing a turnpike company to have “full power and authority
to enter upon all lands and tenements through which they may
87. See Martz, supra note 9 (discussing Dominion Power’s role in the survey
controversy caused by the ACP).
88. See ALA. CODE § 18–1A–50; (1985); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.280;
(1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12–1115; (1955); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18–15–1302;
(1947); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.010; (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18–4–
515 and (2004); 37–3–113; (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48–13; (1967); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 704; (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.370; (2007); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 22–3–85(c) and (d); HAW. REV. STAT. § 101–8; (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7–705;
(1881); 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/22.3; (2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 32–24–1–3;
(2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 314.9; (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26–512; (1964); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 175B.050; (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:217; (2003); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 18231; (2013); MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 12–111; (2006);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164 § 72A; (1968); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.54;
(1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.041; (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11–27–39; (1972);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.420; (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–110; (2013);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15–229; (LexisNexis 1967); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37.050;
(LexisNexis 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371:2–a; (1951); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3–
16; (West 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42A–1–8; (1981); N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW
§ 404; (LexisNexis 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 40A–11; (West 1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 32–15–06; (West 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.03; (LexisNexis
1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 22–114; (West 1984); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 35.220; (West 2003); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 309; (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 24–12–9; (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 28–2–70; (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 49–33–6; (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29–16–121; (1932); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. § 111.019; (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B–6–506; (LexisNexis 2008);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3518; (1947); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 25.1–203, (2005); 56–49,
(2004), and 56–49.01; (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 47.01–170; (West 1984);
W.Va. Code Ann. § 54–1–3; (LexisNexis 1923); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 182.38; (2000);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1–26–506. (2007).
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judge it necessary to make said road; and to lay out the same
according to their pleasure.”89 Successive laws passed in the
Commonwealth of Virginia strengthened and expanded survey
delegation authority: In 1782 Virginia empowered private
surveyors for public roads to enter private land, in 1860 Virginia
granted the authority to companies engaging in “internal
improvement,” and in 1904 the power was extended to any
company empowered with eminent domain delegation.90
Virginia is somewhat atypical of state jurisdictions in its
modern versions of these historic statutes, mostly due to its
modern inclusion of notice requirements and its prohibition on the
use of motor vehicles without owner permission.91 Other versions
of surveying delegation statutes often place limitations on the
extent of the authority given to private companies and may
explicitly hold them liable for any damages, and beyond liability
some jurisdictions also require the private entity to notify the
landowner prior to surveying.92 As Virginia possesses both one of
the more restrictive statutes of this type93 and is one of the
foremost states involved in current pipeline disputes with the
construction of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, it provides an ideal
example of the development of survey delegation jurisprudence.
Delegation of surveying authority is indeed the main iteration
of private delegation of eminent domain powers, with the
Restatement (2d) of Torts stating that:
The privilege of entry for the purpose of performance or exercise
of such duty or authority may be specifically given, as where an
employee of a public utility is in terms authorized to enter upon
privately owned land for the purpose of making surveys
preliminary to instituting a proceeding for taking by eminent
domain.94

89. 2 VA. REV. CODE ch. 234, § 7 (1819).
90. See Palmer, 801 S.E.2d at 419 (outlining the history of survey delegation
statutes in the Commonwealth); see also VA. CODE ANN. tit. 17, ch. 56 § 4 (1860);
VA. CODE ANN. § 1105f(3) (1904).
91. See statutes cited supra note 88 (codifying survey delegation statutes for
each of the fifty states).
92. See generally id.
93. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 56-49.01 (codifying Virginia property law
for right of entry upon land for Natural Gas companies).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 211 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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This granting of a privilege of entry is at the heart of Virginia’s
delegation statute, and delegation in this way has broadly been
upheld by courts. “Indeed, it appears that no court has declared a
statute expressly giving a utility the right to enter private property
for survey purposes before exercising eminent domain authority
facially unconstitutional.”95 Delegation laws are both widespread
and well established in American jurisprudence.96
IV. Survey Delegation Laws as a Taking
A. Survey Delegation and Pipeline Construction
While the basis of statutory delegation in the legal history of
Virginia and the wider United States is difficult to dispute, modern
delegation laws are often used for divergent purposes when
compared with their historic counterparts.97 Early delegation and
eminent domain laws tended to focus on takings that benefitted
the community in some way, such as the Massachusetts 1713 mill
law or Virginia’s 1782 public road construction surveying statute.98
It is telling that early manifestations of surveying delegation laws
almost uniformly deal with surveys taken for the construction of
mills, roads, canals, or other utilities of benefit to the immediate
community: Every early court cited to explore the purpose for
surveying by the Klemic Court is explicitly directed to the
construction of a road or railway.99

95. Klemic, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 690.
96. See statutes cited supra note 88 (listing examples of state-level survey
delegation laws).
97. See Fleck & Hanssen, supra note 80, at 100 (describing the evolution of
eminent domain law from its inception to the present.).
98. See id. (stating that “[t]he justification for these constitutional provisions
was that grist mills were “public necessities” (unground grain had little value)
and were required by law to serve all comers at regulated prices”); see also Palmer,
801 S.E.2d 414 at 419 (“Virginia statutory law has done so for 235 years. In 1782,
a law permitted authorized surveyors to enter private land to survey the location
of public roads and made it unlawful for anyone to ‘stop, oppose, or hinder’
them.”).
99. See Klemic, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 688–89 (discussing the common law
privilege to enter land for surveyor purposes, specifically for the construction of a
road or railway).
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While takings law has evolved to encompass modern utilities
with no analogue in early law,100 this is nonetheless a critical
distinction, as the animating impulse behind these early laws is
often at odds with the uses to which their modern counterparts are
put to.101 A road, canal, or railway provides an immediate benefit
by providing access to the community it is constructed in.102 The
almost sole concern of early eminent domain laws with mills,
roads, and railways is illustrative of this need, as nearly every
community required these necessities—often only able to be
constructed through public use of private property—to survive. A
pipeline, however, is generally only of benefit when viewed from a
wider state or national paradigm and will provide little to no
benefit to many of the communities that it passes through on its
course.
Pipelines like the Atlantic Coast Pipeline may pass through
entire states in their path from the point of origin to coastal ports.
Even in areas in which the pipeline does create jobs and stimulate
economic growth, such benefits are born of a very different nature
than the necessity-based early examples in takings
jurisprudence.103 As a result, the policy behind the early laws and
cases cited in Klemic and Palmer—to survey for public
improvements of immediate benefit to landowners in the
community—is absent in the modern controversies surrounding
pipeline construction. Reliance on common law and historic
statutory support for delegation laws in the context of pipeline
surveying is therefore problematic, and there is a need for a
reevaluation of the current definition of a private survey as not
representing a taking.
100. See Fleck & Hanssen, supra note 80, at 104 (discussing colonial eminent
domain takings).
101. See id. at 100 (“We focus on five episodes of eminent domain use,
involving mill dams (early-to-mid 19th century), railroads (mid-to-late 19th
century), mining in the Rocky Mountain West (late 19th century), urban renewal
(mid-20th century), and Kelo-style economic development (late 20th century to
present).”).
102. See id. at 105 (“All six of the Rocky Mountain states that entered the
Union in the latter part of the 19th century enacted constitutional provisions
allowing miners and mining companies to employ eminent domain directly to
build access roads, dump tailings, dig tunnels, and so forth.”).
103. See id. (juxtaposing the rationale behind early takings necessary for
community development with later economic rationales).
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B. § 56-49.01 after Kelo

Surveying delegation laws have been especially susceptible to
the wider controversies over takings powers centered upon the
divisive Kelo decision. Virginia is one of many states to have passed
statutory and constitutional property safeguards in the aftermath
of Kelo that have raised new taking issues.104 Challenges centered
upon these protections have been brought against Virginia’s
delegation statute, and represent a new strategy for landowners to
resist eminent domain use.105 The amended Article 11 of the
Virginia Constitution reads in pertinent part:
That the General Assembly shall pass no law whereby private
property, the right to which is fundamental, shall be damaged
or taken except for public use. No private property shall be
damaged or taken for public use without just compensation to
the owner thereof. No more private property may be taken than
necessary to achieve the stated public use. Just compensation
shall be no less than the value of the property taken, lost profits
and lost access, and damages to the residue caused by the
taking. The terms “lost profits” and “lost access” are to be
defined by the General Assembly. A public service company,
public service corporation, or railroad exercises the power of
eminent domain for public use when such exercise is for the
authorized provision of utility, common carrier, or railroad
services.106

Virginia’s post-Kelo amendment illustrates the tensions at the
heart of surveying delegation.107 The amendment strengthens
property rights while still explicitly allowing for the delegation of
eminent domain powers to private companies.108 While modern
104. See Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414, 420 (Va. 2017)
(defining the 2012 amendment to Article I, § 11 of the Virginia Constitution as an
acceptance of the Supreme Court’s offer to state governments in Kelo).
105. See id. at 418 (considering Plaintiff’s arguments that Virginia’s post-Kelo
constitutional amendment is unconstitutionally infringed upon by Virginia’s
delegation statute).
106. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.8686
107. See Palmer, 801 S.E.2d at 420 (“[The amendment] . . . limited the
parameters within which eminent domain may be exercised to affect these rights
and expanded the compensation to be paid.”).
108. See id. (explaining that, while Article 11 of the Virginia Constitution does
allow private companies to assert eminent domain power, it also strengthens the
rights of individuals by limiting the definition of “public use” and expanding the
definition of “just compensation”).
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classification of utilities as a public service are ubiquitous,
constitutional protections of private property, especially in the
form of required compensation for a taking, are equally
prevalent.109 Article 11 not only limits takings authority to the
least restrictive public use, but it additionally requires just
compensation to be made for any taking, including losses in profits
and access.110
This definition reflects a robust view of private property
rights, not only protecting against actual confiscations but also
against any other harms—even if largely symbolic, such as
access—that may be caused by the state’s use of eminent domain.
The Klemic decision avoids this issue by defining survey delegation
laws as a limitation on the right to exclude and not as a taking:
Although the Takings Clause protects property rights,
including the right to exclude, it does not itself create them;
“such property interests ‘are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law.’” To determine whether
a landowner has a constitutionally protected property right to
exclude an authorized utility from entering his property for
survey purposes, then, the court must look outside the Takings
Clause.111

The dismissal of the Takings Clause in this instance does not
properly account for the evolution of takings law in response to
Kelo, as evidenced by Virginia’s post-Kelo constitutional
amendment.112 This consideration is significant in the definition of
surveying delegation laws: If delegation authority is found to be
based upon the state’s power of eminent domain, and if the
Constitution of Virginia requires just compensation to be made for
any losses suffered as a result of eminent domain use,113 then there
109. See id. (explaining that Article II of the Virginia Constitution does not
abrogate extensive common law privileges catalogued by the First Restatement
of Torts and recognized in Virginia statutory law).
110. See id. (establishing a limited definition of “public use” expanded
definition of “just compensation”).
111. Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 673, 687 (W.D.
Va. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
112. See Palmer, 801 S.E.2d at 420 (“The 2012 amendment to Article I,
§ 11 accepted this invitation to place further restrictions on the takings power.”).
113. See id. (“The amendment also expands the definition of ‘just
compensation’ to be ‘no less than the value of the property taken, lost profits and
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is a strong argument to be made that surveys like the type
discussed in this note amount to a taking.
While the Palmer decision reached by the Supreme Court of
Virginia rejected the argument that post-Kelo amendments to
Article 11 were violated by the existence of Virginia’s surveying
delegation law, this takings argument was not considered.114
Redefining surveying delegation to constitute a taking would add
protections to affected landowners while allowing for the continued
use of delegated eminent domain power, and such a definition
would not upset the arguments made by the Supreme Court of
Virginia that “[t]he common law has long recognized the privilege
of an entity exercising eminent domain power to enter private
property to conduct surveys [and that] [t]his same privilege has a
well-established historical pedigree in our statutory law.”115
Consideration of private use of surveying powers as a public taking
comports with both the legal legitimacy of surveying delegation
laws and the protections to private property rights passed in the
wake of Kelo.
V. Compensation for Survey-based Takings
A. Compensability
If private use of public eminent domain powers to survey is to
be considered a taking, a question remains as to whether it is
compensable. As noted by the Klemic Court, the Supreme Court of
the United States has not ruled definitively on the question: “While
‘permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation’
always give rise to a compensable taking, ‘temporary limitations
on the right to exclude’ do not.”116 Article 1 requires the
government to compensate for takings, but the temporary nature
lost access, and damages to the residue caused by the taking.’”).
114. See id. 418–20 (stating that “[w]hile the amendment also explicitly states
that the right to “private property” is “fundamental,” nowhere does the amended
language purport to modify existing property rights[,]” and that “Palmer
expressly stated in her reply brief that she is not making a “takings” argument
on appeal”).
115. Id. at 419.
116. Klemic, 138 F. Supp. 3d 691 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982)).
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of the taking clouds this issue.117 While the Palmer decision did not
examine a takings argument on procedural grounds, the Klemic
court expressly rejected an argument that Virginia’s surveying law
creates a compensable taking.118 Despite recognizing that the
Supreme Court has left open the question of non-permanent
compensable takings, the Klemic court stated that “a temporary,
nonexclusive physical invasion that does not unreasonably impair
a property's value or use is not a compensable taking.”119 This
conclusion, far from a legal certainty, elides over an important
distinction in the use of real property for residential purposes,
which is the most visible type of property at issue in modern
pipeline litigation.
The reasoning of the Klemic court was based in part on a
rejection of the plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish the issue at hand
from PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,120 which “offers an
example of a limitation on the right to exclude that does not rise to
a compensable taking.”121 In rejecting the distinction between
117. See VA. CONST. ART. I, § 11 (“No private property shall be damaged or
taken for public use without just compensation to the owner thereof . . . . Just
compensation shall be no less than the value of the property taken, lost profits
and lost access, and damages to the residue caused by the taking.”).
118. See Klemic, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 691 (“Even assuming the existence of a
right to exclude here, the court would still conclude that § 56-49.01 is facially
constitutional under the Takings Clause because it does not effect a compensable
taking of that right.”).
119. Id. at 692.
120. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In PruneYard,
the Supreme Court of the United States heard a case involving whether the
California constitution protected speech on the grounds of a privately-owned
shopping center. Id. at 74. Appellees were soliciting signatures on the grounds of
the shopping center when a private security officer asked them to leave, and they
later filed suit to enjoin the center from prohibiting them from their activities. Id.
The trial court and the California Court of Appeal held that the appellees had no
constitutionally protected right to speech on the premises, and the Supreme Court
of California reversed, finding that the right existed on the private grounds, and
that the property rights of the owners were not infringed. Id. The Supreme Court
found that although a violation of the right to exclude could amount to a taking,
a test must first be applied that considered the character of the taking, its
economic impact, and any interference with the reasonable investment-backed
expectations. Id. at 83. The Court found that the commercial nature of the
shopping center ensured that the taking did not unreasonably impair its value or
use, especially considering that the public was invited onto the grounds of the
private shopping center. Id. at 83–84.
121. Klemic, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 691.
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PruneYard and a challenge to Virginia’s surveying delegation
laws, however, the Klemic court failed to properly recognize the
key distinction between residential and commercial real
property.122
In PruneYard, “a California law required a shopping mall to
allow members of the public to leaflet on its property.”123 “The
shopping mall claimed that the law effected a taking of its right to
exclude without just compensation, in violation of the Takings
Clause.”124 The Supreme Court of the United States found against
the mall, ruling that “[h]ere the requirement that appellants
permit appellees to exercise state-protected rights of free
expression and petition on shopping center property clearly does
not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants’
property rights under the Taking Clause.”125 The commercial
property at issue in PruneYard, however, is of a very different
nature than the residential landholdings at issue in Palmer and
Klemic.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in PruneYard—that a state
law infringing on a mall’s right to exclude without impairing the
value of the property is not a compensable taking—is not
applicable to the situation of a residential landowner, for whom the
possession of the right to exclude may be one of the principal
benefits derived from his or her investment in the real property.126
A mall like the one at the heart of PruneYard functions as a public
commercial space, and therefore infringements that do not affect
the property’s value are of a much less consequential nature than
they are in the residential context.127 In a concurrence to the
122. See id. at 692 (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish the case at hand
from PruneYard). The majority stated:
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish PruneYard, arguing that, unlike a shopping mall,
their properties are used as personal residences . . . . That is true enough, but it
does not take away from the Supreme Court's holding that a temporary,
nonexclusive physical invasion that does not unreasonably impair a property's
value or use is not a compensable taking. Id.
123. Id. at 691 (citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 76–79).
124. Id. at 691 (citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82).
125. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83.
126. See id. at 83 (determining that “[t]here is nothing to suggest that
preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably
impair the value or use of their property as a shopping center”).
127. See id. (noting that “the PruneYard is a large commercial complex that
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PruneYard decision, Justice Powell highlighted the importance of
this distinction, writing that “[s]ignificantly different questions
would be presented if a State authorized strangers to picket or
distribute leaflets in privately owned, freestanding stores and
commercial premises.”128 The purpose of a commercial center like
the one at issue in PruneYard is to attract storefronts who will pay
rent to the owner, an arrangement that only provides benefit to the
merchants if the wider public is actively encouraged to the
property.129 In this context, the right to exclude is still present, but
is a minor element of the value of the property in a commercial
use.130 For real property used for residential purposes, however,
the reverse is true. The right to exclude is particularly important
in a residential context, and a failure to distinguish between the
nature of public commercial and private residential property will
inevitably undermine the ownership rights of a vast number of
Americans.
B. Recommendation
Our legal system is, and has been, willing to require
compensation for purely symbolic harm in the form of the tort of
trespass.131 In the tort of trespass, the law allows for damages for
a violation of the right to exclude even where the actual trespass
covers several city blocks, contains numerous separate business establishments,
and is open to the public at large”).
128. Id. at 96.
129. See id. at 77 (“The PruneYard is open to the public for the purpose of
encouraging the patronizing of its commercial establishments.”).
130. See id. at 84 (“A State is, of course, bound by the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . but here appellants have failed to
demonstrate that the “right to exclude others” is so essential to the use or
economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it
amounted to a “taking.”).
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL
INTRUSIONS ON LAND § 158 (Am. Law Inst. 1965) (recognizing when one is subject
to liability for trespass). The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
(“One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he
thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he
intentionally: (a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a
third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the
land a thing which he is under a duty to removed.”). Id.
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may have not affected the value of the property in any way.132 The
law of trespass recognizes that violation of the right to exclude that
a landowner holds in his or her real property is significant
regardless of the presence of physical damage,133 and it is logical
for takings law to likewise allow for compensation when the harm
caused to the property owner is of a largely symbolic nature. This
is especially true in the instance of residential real property, where
homeowners may rightfully see survey crews as a harbinger of
future loss of their homes and land. It is significant that the fourth
section of Virginia’s survey delegation law specifically states that
the surveys do not constitute a trespass.134 Implicit in the inclusion
of such a statement is the assumption that without the explicitly
protective language, such surveys might be considered to be
trespassory. The principal distinction between an authorized
survey and a trespass is the legitimization of the former under
state takings powers, as opposed to the willingness of the
landowner to have his or her property utilized in such a manner.
This wider understanding of eminent-domain based takings in
light of trespass jurisprudence reflects considerations of both law
and policy. The strong reactions of many state legislatures to Kelo
represent a major shift in takings law, evincing a broader
conception of legal protections of property that is necessarily
accompanied by a narrower range of permissible eminent domain
use without the need for compensation.135 An understanding of
compensable takings that accounts for symbolic takings fits well
with the modern evolution of property rights at the state level,
especially considering the rising prominence of survey
delegation.136 Policy concerns additionally lend support to this
argument, as labeling the practice of surveying delegation as

132. See id. (stating that one is subject to liability for trespass “irrespective of
whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other”).
133. Id.
134. See Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 673, 679
(W.D. Va. 2015) (“Any entry authorized by this section shall not be deemed a
trespass. The natural gas company shall make reimbursement for any actual
damages resulting from such entry.”).
135. See generally Somin, supra note 76.
136. See Martz, supra note 24 (providing an example of how survey delegation
laws have gained prominence in the context of Virginian pipeline development).
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compensable necessarily strengthens the property rights of
landowners.
VI. Appropriate Compensation
If use of survey delegation statutes is to create a compensable
taking of the landowner’s property rights, a question remains as to
the proper mode and level of compensation. Within the Fifth
Amendment’s requirement of just compensation, a great deal of
room exists in the calculation and consideration of the
compensation to be made to the deprived landowner.137 There are
therefore two major arguments for the proper level of
compensation, either by a set nominal fee or through a calculation
incorporated into the wider taking compensation.
A. Nominal Fee as Compensation
One potential solution to the issue of compensation for
survey-based takings is to award a nominal fee for each survey
conducted. Nominal fees are considered the appropriate remedy in
similar trespass cases:
A harmless trespass, while still an actionable trespass, only
entitles the landowner to recover nominal damages. As one
court explained, upon a trespass “[t]he law implies damage to
the owner, and in the absence of proof as to the extent of the
injury, he is entitled to recover nominal damages.”138

Nominal fees are unlikely to have any substantial impact on
the overall exercise of surveying delegation laws and would
engender little negative economic effects on potential future
pipeline projects. The purpose of such a fee, however, is less
economic than it is symbolic. Defining delegated surveying
authority as a compensable taking strengthens the position of the
property owner regardless of the amount awarded for the taking.
137. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (referring to the importance of property rights
in the founding of the United States).
138. Daniel Harris Brean, Ending Unreasonable Royalties: Why Nominal
Damages Are Adequate to Compensate Patent Assertion Entities for Infringement,
39 VT. L. REV. 867 (quoting Pfeiffer v. Grossman, 15 Ill. 53, 54 (Ill. 1853)) at 917).
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Even nominal fees recognize that an invasion of a residential
landowner’s right to exclude is worthy of compensation.139
As the state legislatures are the entities exercising eminent
domain power through survey delegation statutes, it is appropriate
for them to also set a level of compensation for the taking. This
nominal cost could be easily passed to the private company seeking
to make use of the stature to conduct surveys. Allowing each state
to set a nominal fee would reflect the state-based nature of the
survey delegation laws,140 and requiring state legislatures to
compensate landowners would accurately reflect the reality that
surveying delegation laws stem from state takings powers.
B. Compensation as Part of the Takings Analysis
An alternative method for setting the just level of
compensation for use of survey delegation laws incorporates the
survey into the wider takings analysis of the property. The
Supreme Court of the United States has stated from an early point
that the market value of the taken property expressed in monetary
value is the proper remuneration for use of eminent domain
powers.141 This approach would utilize the surveys conducted on a
parcel of real property in calculating the market value owed to a
landowner after eminent domain powers have been used. The
principal advantage to varying the amount compensated based on
the facts of the specific taking is one of flexibility, as the manner,
impact, and duration of the surveys could all be considered in the
evaluation of compensation. The main difficulty of this approach,
however, will be in the determination of the fair market value of
what in many cases will be symbolic takings with no subsequent
permanent use of land.

139. See id. (“Nominal damages are a reasonable result in cases of trespass
where the owner is not substantially injured . . . [a] landowner does not receive a
substantial ‘toll’ for right of passage due to a harmless and innocent
trespass . . . .”).
140. See statutes cited supra note 88 (evincing the state-based nature of
survey delegation laws).
141. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (“That equivalent is
the market value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously
paid in money.”).

THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND?

575

Allowing the courts to determine the proper level of
compensation rather than the legislature would be logical in
consideration of the similar role exercised by the judicial system in
compensating permanent takings142 and violations of the right to
exclude like those found in tort law.143 Judicial control would
additionally recognize that just compensation for a violation of a
landowner’s right to exclude might not be met in all cases by the
low level of a nominal sum. As the legislature is the font of the
takings power condensed in survey delegation statutes, judicial
control of compensation would also prevent a legislature from
setting the level of compensation at an entirely insignificant level.
Compensation to landowners for the use of survey delegation
laws properly recognizes the nature of the legal interaction taking
place between the landowner, the state, and the surveying private
company. Both possibilities of compensation as set at a nominal
level by the legislature or considered as part of a wider analysis by
the courts reflect the takings-based nature of the surveys
conducted, and as such either would function as appropriate
redress.
VII. Conclusion
As the construction of new energy infrastructure continues to
give rise to heated conflicts in the courts, a need has developed for a
legal evolution. Suits brought against the construction of pipelines in
Virginia alone have succeeded in delaying and potentially derailing
both the Atlantic Coast144 and Mountain Valley145 pipeline projects.
These legal battles have united environmental interest groups with
individual property owners and against utility developers, creating a
shifting landscape of revoked permits and bitter suits.

142. See id. (discussing how to ascertain just compensation for which
petitioners are entitled for permanent takings).
143. See generally Brean, supra note 138.
144. See Surran, supra note 17 (discussing the delay to the Atlantic Coast
Pipeline caused by the Fourth Circuit’s stay).
145. See Lopez, supra note 29 (“Leaders behind the Mountain Valley
Pipeline say the project may never get finished. A report the company filed with
a federal agency said the difficulties with getting necessary approval could delay
the project, make it too costly or cause it to not get built at all.”).
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This expansion of modern pipeline construction146 has collided
with resurgent state and federal-based property rights, and in this
context survey delegation laws have gained a newfound prominence.
The delegation of state eminent domain authority to private entities
for surveying purposes is an established practice in American
jurisprudence, although its modern use in pipeline construction
diverges notably from its original purpose.147 This discrepancy is
made especially glaring by the widespread passage of laws and
amendments designed to strengthen individual property rights in the
wake of the Kelo decision.148 There is therefore a need to reevaluate
the legal categorization of survey delegation laws in the modern
context. Delegation of eminent domain powers in the context of
surveying should be considered a compensable taking, a position that
both reflects the takings-based character of the delegation laws and
comports with similar doctrines in tort law. Compensation by
nominal fee would serve to bolster the rights of landowners while
minimalizing judicial impact on economic development, while
compensation as part of a larger takings analysis would allow for
greater flexibility and recognition of the landowner’s rights to
exclude. Either method sufficiently recognizes that a takings-based
violation of the landowner’s right to exclude has occurred when
survey delegation laws are exercised by private utility developers.
While this solution may not alleviate the ultimate taking of
property in the development of pipelines, it represents a logical
narrowing of takings authority that will benefit landowners
nationwide. As energy infrastructure continues to grow it will become
increasingly important to adequately protect the rights of property
owners at every stage of the takings process. The legal evolution
proposed in this Note, albeit a minor one in the grander body of
takings jurisprudence, will be a positive step in that direction.
146. See generally Pending Natural Gas Pipeline Projects, RBN ENERGY LLC,
https://rbnenergy.com/midi/gas-projects (listing pending natural gas pipeline
projects) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice) (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
147. See Fleck & Hanssen, supra note 80 (discussing the origins of eminent
domain law in mill and road construction as opposed to the economic development
rationale articulated in Kelo).
148. See Somin, supra note 76 at 2102 (“Forty-three states have enacted postKelo reform legislation to curb eminent domain. The Kelo backlash probably
resulted in more new state legislation than any other Supreme Court decision in
history.”) (citations omitted).

